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SQL injection is a code
injection technique, used to attack data driven applications, in which
malicious SQL statements are inserted into an entry field for execution (e.g.
to dump the database contents to the attacker).SQL injection must exploit a security vulnerability in an application's
software, for example, when user input is either incorrectly filtered for string
literal escape characters embedded in SQL statements or user
input is not strongly typed and
unexpectedly executed. SQL injection is mostly known as an attack vector for websites but can be used to attack
any type of SQL database.
Incorrectly filtered escape characters
This form of
SQL injection occurs when user input is not filtered for escape characters and is then passed into a SQL
statement. This results in the potential manipulation of the statements
performed on the database by the end-user of the application.
The following
line of code illustrates this vulnerability:
statement = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '"
+ userName + "';"
This SQL code
is designed to pull up the records of the specified username from its table of
users. However, if the "userName" variable is crafted in a specific
way by a malicious user, the SQL statement may do more than the code author
intended. For example, setting the "userName" variable as:
' or '1'='1
or using
comments to even block the rest of the query (there are three types of SQL
comments):
' or '1'='1' -- '
' or '1'='1' ({ '
' or '1'='1' /* '
renders one of
the following SQL statements by the parent language:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '' OR '1'='1';
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '' OR '1'='1' -- ';
If this code
were to be used in an authentication procedure then this example could be used
to force the selection of a valid username because the evaluation of '1'='1' is
always true.
The following
value of "userName" in the statement below would cause the deletion
of the "users" table as well as the selection of all data from the
"userinfo" table (in essence revealing the information of every
user), using an API that allows multiple statements:
a';DROP TABLE users; SELECT * FROM userinfo WHERE 't' =
't
This input
renders the final SQL statement as follows and specified:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = 'a';DROP TABLE users; SELECT
* FROM userinfo WHERE 't' = 't';
While most SQL
server implementations allow multiple statements to be executed with one call
in this way, some SQL APIs such as PHP's mysql_query(); function do not allow this for
security reasons. This prevents attackers from injecting entirely separate
queries, but doesn't stop them from modifying queries.
Incorrect type handling
This form of
SQL injection occurs when a user-supplied field is not strongly typed or is not checked for type constraints. This could take place when a
numeric field is to be used in a SQL statement, but the programmer makes no
checks to validate that the user supplied input is numeric. For example:
statement := "SELECT * FROM userinfo WHERE id =
" + a_variable + ";"
It is clear
from this statement that the author intended a_variable to be a number
correlating to the "id" field. However, if it is in fact a string
then the end-user may manipulate the statement as they
choose, thereby bypassing the need for escape characters. For example, setting
a_variable to
1;DROP TABLE users
will drop
(delete) the "users" table from the database, since the SQL becomes:
SELECT * FROM userinfo WHERE id=1;DROP TABLE users;
Blind SQL injection
Blind SQL
Injection is used when a web application is vulnerable to an SQL injection but
the results of the injection are not visible to the attacker. The page with the
vulnerability may not be one that displays data but will display differently
depending on the results of a logical statement injected into the legitimate
SQL statement called for that page. This type of attack can become
time-intensive because a new statement must be crafted for each bit recovered.
There are several tools that can automate these attacks once the location of
the vulnerability and the target information has been established.
Conditional responses
One type of
blind SQL injection forces the database to evaluate a logical statement on an
ordinary application screen. As an example, a book review website uses a query string to determine which book review to
display. So the URL http://books.example.com/showReview.php?ID=5 would cause the server to run the
query
SELECT * FROM bookreviews WHERE ID = '5';
from which it
would populate the review page with data from the review with ID 5, stored in the table bookreviews.
The query happens completely on the server; the user does not know the names of
the database, table, or fields, nor does the user know the query string. The
user only sees that the above URL returns a book review. A hacker
can load the URLs http://books.example.com/showReview.php?ID=5 AND 1=1 and http://books.example.com/showReview.php?ID=5 AND 1=2, which may result in queries
SELECT * FROM bookreviews WHERE ID = '5' AND '1'='1';
SELECT * FROM bookreviews WHERE ID = '5' AND '1'='2';
respectively.
If the original review loads with the "1=1" URL and a blank or error
page is returned from the "1=2" URL, the site is likely vulnerable to
a SQL injection attack. The hacker may proceed with this query string designed
to reveal the version number of MySQL running on the server: http://books.example.com/showReview.php?ID=5 AND substring(@@version,1,1)=4, which would show the book review on a
server running MySQL 4 and a blank or error page otherwise. The hacker can
continue to use code within query strings to glean more information from the
server until another avenue of attack is discovered or his or her goals are
achieved.
Mitigation
Parameterized statements
With most
development platforms, parameterized statements that work with parameters can
be used (sometimes called placeholders or bind variables) instead of embedding user input
in the statement. A placeholder can only store a value of the given type and
not an arbitrary SQL fragment. Hence the SQL injection would simply be treated
as a strange (and probably invalid) parameter value.
In many cases,
the SQL statement is fixed, and each parameter is a scalar, not a table. The user
input is then assigned (bound) to a parameter.
Enforcement at the coding level
Using object-relational
mapping libraries avoids the need to write SQL code. The ORM library
in effect will generate parameterized SQL statements from object-oriented code.
Escaping
A
straightforward, though error-prone, way to prevent injections is to escape
characters that have a special meaning in SQL. The manual for an SQL DBMS
explains which characters have a special meaning, which allows creating a
comprehensive blacklist of
characters that need translation. For instance, every occurrence of a single
quote (') in a
parameter must be replaced by two single quotes ('') to form a valid SQL string literal. For example, in PHP
it is usual to escape parameters using the function mysql_real_escape_string(); before sending the SQL query:
$query = sprintf("SELECT * FROM `Users` WHERE
UserName='%s' AND Password='%s'",
mysql_real_escape_string($Username),
mysql_real_escape_string($Password));
mysql_query($query);
This function,
i.e. mysql_real_escape_string(), calls MySQL's library function
mysql_real_escape_string, which prepends backslashes to the following
characters: \x00, \n, \r, \, ', " and \x1a. This function must always
(with few exceptions) be used to make data safe before sending a query to MySQL.
There are other functions for many database types in PHP such as
pg_escape_string() for PostgreSQL. There is,
however, one function that works for escaping characters, and is used
especially for querying on databases that do not have escaping functions in
PHP. This function is: addslashes(string $str ). It returns a string
with backslashes before characters that need to be quoted in database queries,
etc. These characters are single quote ('), double quote ("), backslash
(\) and NUL (the NULL byte).
Routinely passing escaped strings to SQL is error prone because it is easy to
forget to escape a given string. Creating a transparent layer to secure the
input can reduce this error-proneness, if not entirely eliminate it.
Pattern check
Integer, float
or boolean parameters can be checked if their value is valid representation for
the given type. Strings that must follow some strict pattern (date, UUID,
alphanumeric only, etc.) can be checked if they match this pattern.
Database permissions
Limiting the
permissions on the database logon used by the web application to only what is
needed may help reduce the effectiveness of any SQL injection attacks that
exploit any bugs in the web application.
For example on
SQL server, a database logon could be restricted from selecting on some of the
system tables which would limit exploits that try to insert JavaScript into all
the text columns in the database.
deny SELECT ON sys.sysobjects TO webdatabaselogon;
deny SELECT ON sys.objects TO webdatabaselogon;
deny SELECT ON sys.TABLES TO webdatabaselogon;
deny SELECT ON sys.views TO webdatabaselogon;